World for Peace

India and China’s nuclear weapons comparison: Why Chinese scholars are wrong

The nuclear relations between India and China are evidently benign – neither country has ever faced an open nuclear threat, nor have both sides indulged in a flapping nuclear sabre. Each year, they all meet for strategic dialogues addressing nuclear issues.

India and China’s nuclear weapons comparison: Why Chinese scholars are wrongI

ndia and China’s nuclear relations are evidently benign — the two countries have never confronted each other with an overt nuclear threat, nor have the two sides indulged in rattling atomic sabre. All meet each year for strategic dialogues, addressing nuclear issues. There is also a lot of doctrinal assurance that both sides maintain minimum arsenals for credible deterrence, pursue a nuclear weapons no-first-use policy and have extended negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states. It became apparent in 2017 during the two-month Doklam standoff, during which neither of the two sides issued a nuclear warning.

Chinese scholars also think that India’s position in China’s nuclear calculus is inconsequential. China’s nuclear and conventional military supremacy negates any deterrence vis-à-vis India. Furthermore, considering that neither side has exchanged fire at their contested border, a hot war between them is unlikely. They further argue that much of China’s nuclear advances toward the United States are vectored. China’s specific role is to ensure that its capabilities in retaliatory strike are properly aimed at the United States.

It’s clear that when the Indian strategic group raises questions about China, they find it perplexing. Many Chinese scholars attribute this to India’s efforts to create traditional dominance over Pakistan , especially given the strong security relations that Pakistan has with China. Some relate it to India’s attempt to override domestic opposition to its nuclear weapons program which it pursues in its bid to become a global power. Regardless of the narrative given, the general view within China’s scholarship is that much of India’s concern about China is theoretical and without foundation.

When India conducted the fourth and subsequent pre-operational tests of its 2012 long-range Agni V missile, which has the capacity to reach beyond Tibet, to China’s heartland and northern borders, the Chinese strategic community seemed particularly piqued. The Chinese Foreign Ministry ‘s spokesperson raised concerns about the propriety of India’s nuclear missile program by referring to UN Security Council Resolution 1172 of 6 June 1998 (which is apparently non-binding on India). Chinese analysts have views that Indian nuclear weapons are being deployed against China, and that India could face security challenges in the future. The propaganda paper Global Times, run by the Chinese Communist Party, reacted bitterly, blaming Western countries for their carelessness about India’s status as a nuclear-weapons state, and then pushing for Pakistan to have the privileges of India’s nuclear-weapons production.

Indeed, China has provided Pakistan comprehensive assistance in improving its nuclear-weapon capabilities. In the 1990’s, China supplied Pakistan with nuclear material and resources to help develop a plutonium reactor and ring magnets for Pakistan’s enrichment programme. The US Congressional Report released in August 2006 disclosed China’s breach of existing standards for the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in the sale of Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 nuclear reactors to Pakistan. China has also peddled the designs and technologies of its ‘M’ ballistic missile series to help Pakistan develop the Shaheen I and II medium-range ballistic missiles, in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Lately, China has sold modified Type 41 Yuan-class diesel-electric submarines to Pakistan, and there is growing concern that China may be using the Gwadar and Karachi bases for its own nuclear and conventional submarines.

India is facing a situation where not only has China provided Pakistan with nuclear weapons designs and materials, but it has also provided Pakistan with missile manufacturing technology and equipment capable of carrying nuclear weapons to all parts of India, including the Andaman Islands, which Pakistan has constantly used to target and threaten India. These developments contravene the MTCR and are guidelines for the NSG.

Consequently, Chinese scholars are wrong in their assessment of India’s concerns which they attribute to India’s sense of vulnerability and its ambitions for the role of great power. We are even incorrect in blameting India for undermining South Asia’s security situation. In response to the diabolical Sino-Pak nuclear axis India’s nuclear weapons program was established. Yet India has been extremely restrained in advancing its nuclear programme. Despite being a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), India has followed policies that are consistent with key NPT provisions applicable to nuclear-weapon states. India has consistently demonstrated its commitment to establishing a stable world order, and has been able to gain international interlocutors’ trust.

India’s concerns about China are neither imaginary nor unsubstantiated. India faces severe security threats from Pakistan and the latter has been strongly supported by China. The most important cause of uncertainty in the region is China’s assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme.

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